Tag Archives: P5+1

Historic deal that will prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon

Newsroom24x7 Desk

President Obama statement on Iran
US President Barack Obama, with Vice President Joe Biden, delivers remarks in the East Room of the White House in Washington after negotiations culminated into the Iran nuclear deal.

Washington DC: After many months of principled diplomacy, the P5+1 — the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, Russia and Germany — along with the European Union, have achieved a long-term comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran that will verifiably prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon and ensure that Iran’s nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful going forward.

Making this announcement in a speech from White House, US President Barack Obama said that this deal stands on the foundation of the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA), achieved in November of 2013, and the framework for this Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), announced in Lausanne on April 2, 2015 that set the requirements for the deal with the P5+ 1 and Iran, alongside the European Union announced today.

With this deal in place, the U.S., and its allies, and the international community can know that tough, new requirements will keep Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, Obama pointed out.

iran nuclear dealBuilding a nuclear bomb requires either uranium or plutonium. But with this deal, Iran’s four possible ways to leverage those fissile materials are blocked.

Click here for  Transcript of the US President Barack Obama’s Speech

 

Iran talks in Vienna: Players have entered the working hard phase

Newsroom24x7 Desk

Iran nuclear programVienna, Austria: With most of the ministers out of town, the Vienna meeting on Iran Nuclear deal today entered the working hard phase and the expert groups took advantage of the time to grind through as many of the details as they possibly could and one of the teams met with their Iranian counterparts for six hours on Tuesday to finish an important round.

In between, US Secretary of State John Kerry has been telling those on the sidelines as he walks by: “People are working hard, we’re working hard.”
The other P5+1 ministers to come back into town over the weekend, probably Sunday.

What has emerged so far is that the P5+1 is staying coordinated through the political directors, who are obviously around and the ministers are getting reports from the teams regularly throughout the day, providing guidance, checking in with each other when necessary.

Kerry himself noted, he had two interactions with Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif today. First time it was by chance when they just pulled each other aside for what was just a few minutes, and then the next meeting that took place towards the end of the day.
Almost every minister, including Zarif, who’s come through to check in on the process has said there is progress.

Despite the optimism on the progress front, till this evening, it was not clear what are the big issues that are not resolved.

A senior US Administration official, at a background briefing here, denied there was any deadline to close the deal and said: “eventually, this is going to have to come down to some significant political decisions that can only be made at the level of ministers, and even then, only by checking back with capitals. All the work that’s going on now is designed to close out as many issues as possible so that those don’t have to come to the ministers and then tee up the others for decision by the ministers when the time is right.”

It is apparent that the meetings at this stage in Vienna are revolving around the sanctions issue and the nuclear issue – something that is being denied by the main players. The US official said “there are very, very hard nuclear issues as well.”

When a journalist came up with a poswer stating: “what I understand from Iranian colleagues as well, that the timing of the sanctions relief – not the immediate, but they want the steps to be at the same time, and that that was something that they were very focused on”, the US Administration official said: “I think it’s safe to say that the Iranians have been very public about the fact that they want as much clarity as possible about how that process is going to work, and so to a very large extent the sanctions meetings have been focused on finding language that clarifies how things would proceed in the event of a deal.”

When a journalist observed that Iran in the past has opposed Westerners being part of an inspections team given that there is some concern regarding states that actually are nuclear-weapons states and have familiarity with what that would look like, the US official said: “this would be in the category of things that given the sensitivity of this particular issue, I’m not going to get into any of the details of the PMD discussion.He further said, “this would be in the category of things that given the sensitivity of this particular issue, I’m not going to get into any of the details of the PMD discussion.”

Shadow of a possible cyber attack on Iran nuclear negotiations

Newsroom24x7 Desk

Iran nuclear programWashington DC: After the disclosure by the Swiss Attorney General yesterday that they had searched a house in Geneva and seized computer material linked to a possible cyber attack on the Iran nuclear negotiations, the official stand of United States on this sensitive issue is that they have always been aware of the need to take steps to ensure the confidentiality of these discussions and there is nothing new to announce in that regard.

Jeff Rathke, Director, US department of State Press Office made this point at the daily press briefing here on Thursday.

When asked whether the US had increased the security to ensure the confidentiality of the negotiations after reports of possible Cyber attack and also if the US was assisting the Swiss authorities in their investigations and whether or not they had sought any information from the United States about this? Rathke replied: “we’ve always been aware of the need to take steps to ensure the confidentiality of our discussions. So I don’t have any new steps to announce in that regard.”

On being asked by a journalist – “Does the U.S. trust that the Swiss or the Austrians can provide secure facilities in order for these international talks to be conducted, or is the U.S. now looking at trying to find a venue, perhaps in one of the P5+1 countries, where, ostensibly, there’s a little more of a vested interest in trying to protect the sanctity of these negotiations?” Rathke’s response was: “As we’ve said throughout the negotiations and – we’ve taken steps throughout the negotiations to ensure that confidential details and discussions remain behind closed doors. We have close working relationships with Switzerland, with Austria, and indeed with other European partners. So I don’t have anything beyond that to add.

Pressed for steps being taken by the US to ensure confidentiality of nuclear negotiations, Rathke said: we don’t negotiate in public, we also take steps to make sure that the classified and sensitive negotiating details stay behind closed doors. I’m not going to get further into the details of those steps that we take.

Iran’s Nuclear Programme and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)

Newsroom24x7 Desk

Iran nuclear programWashington DC: The US has made major headway in its efforts to contain Iran and prevent it from building or acquiring nuclear weapons through a proposed Nuclear Agreement and this is amply reflected by a joint comprehensive Plan of Action regarding the Iran’s Nuclear Program that has just been released by the US State Department

The key parameters of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear program that were decided in Lausanne, Switzerland are now on the table and in the public domain. These would form the foundation upon which the final text of the JCPOA will be written between now and June 30, and reflect the significant progress that has been made in discussions between the P5+1, the European Union, and Iran.

According to the US State department, important implementation details are still subject to negotiation, and nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.

Iran has agreed to implement the Additional Protocol of the IAEA, providing the IAEA much greater access and information regarding Iran’s nuclear program, including both declared and undeclared facilities.

The IAEA will have regular access to all of Iran’s nuclear facilities, including to Iran’s enrichment facility at Natanz and its former enrichment facility at Fordow, and including the use of the most up-to-date, modern monitoring technologies.

Inspectors will have access to the supply chain that supports Iran’s nuclear program. The new transparency and inspections mechanisms will closely monitor materials and/or components to prevent diversion to a secret program.

Inspectors will have access to uranium mines and continuous surveillance at uranium mills, where Iran produces yellowcake, for 25 years.

Inspectors will have continuous surveillance of Iran’s centrifuge rotors and bellows production and storage facilities for 20 years. Iran’s centrifuge manufacturing base will be frozen and under continuous surveillance.

All centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure removed from Fordow and Natanz will be placed under continuous monitoring by the IAEA.

A dedicated procurement channel for Iran’s nuclear program will be established to monitor and approve, on a case by case basis, the supply, sale, or transfer to Iran of certain nuclear-related and dual use materials and technology – an additional transparency measure.

Enrichment

Iran has agreed to reduce by approximately two-thirds its installed centrifuges. Iran will go from having about 19,000 installed today to 6,104 installed under the deal, with only 5,060 of these enriching uranium for 10 years. All 6,104 centrifuges will be IR-1s, Iran’s first-generation centrifuge.

Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium over 3.67 percent for at least 15 years.

Iran has agreed to reduce its current stockpile of about 10,000 kg of low-enriched uranium (LEU) to 300 kg of 3.67 percent LEU for 15 years.

All excess centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure will be placed in IAEA monitored storage and will be used only as replacements for operating centrifuges and equipment.

Iran has agreed to not build any new facilities for the purpose of enriching uranium for 15 years.

Iran’s breakout timeline – the time that it would take for Iran to acquire enough fissile material for one weapon – is currently assessed to be 2 to 3 months. That timeline will be extended to at least one year, for a duration of at least ten years, under this framework.
Iran will convert its facility at Fordow so that it is no longer used to enrich uranium

Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium at its Fordow facility for at least 15 years.

Iran has agreed to convert its Fordow facility so that it is used for peaceful purposes only – into a nuclear, physics, technology, research center.

Iran has agreed to not conduct research and development associated with uranium enrichment at Fordow for 15 years.

Iran will not have any fissile material at Fordow for 15 years.

Almost two-thirds of Fordow’s centrifuges and infrastructure will be removed. The remaining centrifuges will not enrich uranium. All centrifuges and related infrastructure will be placed under IAEA monitoring.

Iran will only enrich uranium at the Natanz facility, with only 5,060 IR-1 first-generation centrifuges for ten years.

Iran has agreed to only enrich uranium using its first generation (IR-1 models) centrifuges at Natanz for ten years, removing its more advanced centrifuges.

Iran will remove the 1,000 IR-2M centrifuges currently installed at Natanz and place them in IAEA monitored storage for ten years.

Iran will not use its IR-2, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, or IR-8 models to produce enriched uranium for at least ten years. Iran will engage in limited research and development with its advanced centrifuges, according to a schedule and parameters which have been agreed to by the P5+1.

For ten years, enrichment and enrichment research and development will be limited to ensure a breakout timeline of at least 1 year. Beyond 10 years, Iran will abide by its enrichment and enrichment R&D plan submitted to the IAEA, and pursuant to the JCPOA, under the Additional Protocol resulting in certain limitations on enrichment capacity.
Inspections and Transparency

Iran will be required to grant access to the IAEA to investigate suspicious sites or allegations of a covert enrichment facility, conversion facility, centrifuge production facility, or yellowcake production facility anywhere in the country.

Iran has agreed to implement Modified Code 3.1 requiring early notification of construction of new facilities.

Iran will implement an agreed set of measures to address the IAEA’s concerns regarding the Possible Military Dimensions (PMD) of its program.
Reactors and Reprocessing