Tag Archives: IAEA

China welcomes the new resolution on Iranian nuclear program

Newsroom24x7 Desk

China foriegn ministry spokespersonHong Kong : International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conducted a meeting of the Board of Governors this week and adopted a new resolution on the Iranian nuclear issue. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the Republic of China, Hong Lei, spoke in a press conference and stated that China welcomed the adoption of a resolution by the IAEA Board of Governors on December 15 which would close investigations into possible military dimensions to the Iranian nuclear program and pave the way for the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

Lei added that China commended the efforts made by the IAEA and Iran for the settlement of the issue. The preparatory work for implementing the JCPOA was proceeding in the right direction, he said, adding, it was going well as P5+1 and Iran had taken concrete actions to show their political support. The Chinese side is determined to stand ready to work with the other parties, act in strict accordance with the JCPOA, and speed up all preparatory work so that the Implementation Day can come at an early date.

Answering to questions raised by a reporter regarding the 3rd foreign ministers’ meeting on Syria scheduled to be held tomorrow, December 18, in New York, when asked whether China would attend the meeting, and if it did, what would China’s expectations be from the meeting, Lei said — China welcomes and supports the 3rd foreign ministers’ meeting of the International Syria Support Group (ISSG). As a member of the ISSG, China will actively participate in the meeting. In our view, the goal of the meeting is to achieve more positive and practical results based on the outcomes of the previous two foreign ministers’ meetings. The focus is to build up consensus on major issues like the launch of political dialogue between the Syrian government and the opposition as well as the national ceasefire arrangements so as to move forward Syria’s political process. China stands ready to work with all parties to contribute to the political settlement of the Syrian issue.

A reporter raised the querry of South china Sea disputed and referred to a BBC report stating China’s construction activities on relevant islands and reefs in the South China Sea, which had damaged marine ecological environment. When asked about China’s response on this matter, the spokesperson said — The relevant report is severely biased and misleading. The Nansha Islands are China’s territory. China cares about ecological protection of relevant islands, reefs and waters more than anyone. China has gone through scientific evaluation and argumentation before undertaking the construction on the islands and reefs. Placing equal emphasis on construction and protection, China has taken into full account issues like ecological environment and fishery protection, strictly followed environmental standards and requirements during construction, and adopted many effective measures to protect ecological environment.

Iran’s Nuclear Programme and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)

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Iran nuclear programWashington DC: The US has made major headway in its efforts to contain Iran and prevent it from building or acquiring nuclear weapons through a proposed Nuclear Agreement and this is amply reflected by a joint comprehensive Plan of Action regarding the Iran’s Nuclear Program that has just been released by the US State Department

The key parameters of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear program that were decided in Lausanne, Switzerland are now on the table and in the public domain. These would form the foundation upon which the final text of the JCPOA will be written between now and June 30, and reflect the significant progress that has been made in discussions between the P5+1, the European Union, and Iran.

According to the US State department, important implementation details are still subject to negotiation, and nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.

Iran has agreed to implement the Additional Protocol of the IAEA, providing the IAEA much greater access and information regarding Iran’s nuclear program, including both declared and undeclared facilities.

The IAEA will have regular access to all of Iran’s nuclear facilities, including to Iran’s enrichment facility at Natanz and its former enrichment facility at Fordow, and including the use of the most up-to-date, modern monitoring technologies.

Inspectors will have access to the supply chain that supports Iran’s nuclear program. The new transparency and inspections mechanisms will closely monitor materials and/or components to prevent diversion to a secret program.

Inspectors will have access to uranium mines and continuous surveillance at uranium mills, where Iran produces yellowcake, for 25 years.

Inspectors will have continuous surveillance of Iran’s centrifuge rotors and bellows production and storage facilities for 20 years. Iran’s centrifuge manufacturing base will be frozen and under continuous surveillance.

All centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure removed from Fordow and Natanz will be placed under continuous monitoring by the IAEA.

A dedicated procurement channel for Iran’s nuclear program will be established to monitor and approve, on a case by case basis, the supply, sale, or transfer to Iran of certain nuclear-related and dual use materials and technology – an additional transparency measure.

Enrichment

Iran has agreed to reduce by approximately two-thirds its installed centrifuges. Iran will go from having about 19,000 installed today to 6,104 installed under the deal, with only 5,060 of these enriching uranium for 10 years. All 6,104 centrifuges will be IR-1s, Iran’s first-generation centrifuge.

Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium over 3.67 percent for at least 15 years.

Iran has agreed to reduce its current stockpile of about 10,000 kg of low-enriched uranium (LEU) to 300 kg of 3.67 percent LEU for 15 years.

All excess centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure will be placed in IAEA monitored storage and will be used only as replacements for operating centrifuges and equipment.

Iran has agreed to not build any new facilities for the purpose of enriching uranium for 15 years.

Iran’s breakout timeline – the time that it would take for Iran to acquire enough fissile material for one weapon – is currently assessed to be 2 to 3 months. That timeline will be extended to at least one year, for a duration of at least ten years, under this framework.
Iran will convert its facility at Fordow so that it is no longer used to enrich uranium

Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium at its Fordow facility for at least 15 years.

Iran has agreed to convert its Fordow facility so that it is used for peaceful purposes only – into a nuclear, physics, technology, research center.

Iran has agreed to not conduct research and development associated with uranium enrichment at Fordow for 15 years.

Iran will not have any fissile material at Fordow for 15 years.

Almost two-thirds of Fordow’s centrifuges and infrastructure will be removed. The remaining centrifuges will not enrich uranium. All centrifuges and related infrastructure will be placed under IAEA monitoring.

Iran will only enrich uranium at the Natanz facility, with only 5,060 IR-1 first-generation centrifuges for ten years.

Iran has agreed to only enrich uranium using its first generation (IR-1 models) centrifuges at Natanz for ten years, removing its more advanced centrifuges.

Iran will remove the 1,000 IR-2M centrifuges currently installed at Natanz and place them in IAEA monitored storage for ten years.

Iran will not use its IR-2, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, or IR-8 models to produce enriched uranium for at least ten years. Iran will engage in limited research and development with its advanced centrifuges, according to a schedule and parameters which have been agreed to by the P5+1.

For ten years, enrichment and enrichment research and development will be limited to ensure a breakout timeline of at least 1 year. Beyond 10 years, Iran will abide by its enrichment and enrichment R&D plan submitted to the IAEA, and pursuant to the JCPOA, under the Additional Protocol resulting in certain limitations on enrichment capacity.
Inspections and Transparency

Iran will be required to grant access to the IAEA to investigate suspicious sites or allegations of a covert enrichment facility, conversion facility, centrifuge production facility, or yellowcake production facility anywhere in the country.

Iran has agreed to implement Modified Code 3.1 requiring early notification of construction of new facilities.

Iran will implement an agreed set of measures to address the IAEA’s concerns regarding the Possible Military Dimensions (PMD) of its program.
Reactors and Reprocessing

P5 nations for minimization of Radioactive Emissions from Fission-Based Medical Isotope production

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medical isotopesWashington DC: After the conclusion of the Sixth P5 Conference that took place February 4–5, 2015 in London, the People’s Republic of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States have issued a joint statement asserting all States should ensure minimization of radioactive emissions from fission-based medical isotope production.

The statement puts on record that the P5 recognise that while medical isotope production is a critically important activity and while the objective of ensuring the security of supply of medical radioisotopes is of utmost importance, they share a common interest in minimizing the interference of xenon radioisotope releases with global radioactive monitoring activity. The P5 believe that all States should engage with producers in their regions to assess the amount of emissions and to reduce where it is possible their negative impact on the environment through minimization of emissions from fission-based medical isotope production.

Further, the P5 advocate that the CTBTO Executive Secretary continue working actively with interested States, other relevant international organizations, and with radioisotope production facilities to minimize where it is possible the impact from the release of xenon radioisotopes.

Activities that the P5 support include the series of Workshops on the Signatures of Medical and Industrial Isotope Production (WOSMIP), and an IAEA Coordinated Research Project (CRP) “Sharing and Developing Protocols to Further Minimize Radioactive Gaseous Releases to the Environment in the Manufacture of Medical Radioisotopes, as Good Manufacture Practices.”